It just stopped being their cost centre along the way.
A European appliance brand decided it needed its own people in China. I was the first person they hired. I led the office fit-out, wrote the processes, and hired every person on the team.
What that team did was not sourcing. It was running the brand's manufacturing at finished-product level: a full bill of materials, thirty to sixty suppliers, quality, cost, audits, tooling, and the awkward conversations that happen at 7am Chinese time because something has gone wrong before Europe wakes up.
Twelve years later the brand changed strategy and the representative office was closed. I was the one who wound it down — and then, with their chief engineer as my partner, set up the company that took the same work over. Same people, same standards. The brand kept the capability and stopped carrying the fixed overhead.
I did not read about that transition in a case study. I ran it, from the side being transitioned.
Today the same operation runs for an 80-year-old European small-appliance manufacturer and for a major European grocery chain. A brand and a retailer are not the same discipline — different audit regimes, different seasonality, different definitions of a defect. Running both is the evidence that this is a process rather than something shaped around one client.
I was born in 1979 in a mountain village in Ruijin, Jiangxi. My father rode log rafts down the river until the trade disappeared, then laid bricks. I started cutting firewood at six. My mother borrowed my technical-college tuition from relatives half a yuan and a yuan at a time; the largest single contribution came from my grandmother, who could not read and kept her savings under her bed.
In 1996 I left for a factory job in Shenzhen with thirty yuan in my pocket, which was not enough to get there. A classmate lent me thirty more on the way, my new boss advanced the uniform fee, and the security captain in my dormitory gave me thirty yuan for a sleeping mat and a washbasin. Six hundred yuan a month, room and board, making heating cores for hair dryers — and testing them against UL, IEC and EN until they passed.
That was the first thing I learned that still holds: the work either meets the standard or it does not, and no amount of explanation moves that line.
What followed was thirty years of the same industry from most of its angles — technician, engineer, team lead, employee number one at a start-up factory, supplier auditor, product developer, country manager, partner. Around 366 projects and 50 million units, mostly for European and American brands of the kind where a quality failure is not a bad review but a recall across forty countries.
The lesson that repeated most often: most manufacturing problems are design problems in disguise, and the difference between a product that ships and one that dies is usually decided months before anyone cuts steel.
The whole of it, including the parts that did not work →
A page like this is usually a list of things that went well, which tells you nothing about how someone behaves when they do not.
Two businesses failed. In 2011 a friend and I started a metal stamping company, reasoning that the process was simple and the equipment cheap. We lost money for a year. We had assumed that years of engineering experience meant we could run the business — and ignored everything a business actually needs: experienced people and a supply base. The simplest process still has both.
In 2012 we bought a stainless-steel components factory with three hundred people and a tier-one position at a German appliance brand. This time we had technology, customers and an experienced partner. Within a year I held 40 percent of a company I no longer had any say in. Rather than let it stall and take our customers' production down with it, I signed the whole stake over and walked out with nothing.
Friendship cannot substitute for knowing whether two people can get something done together. I choose partners from people I have already worked with now — customers and suppliers, not friends.
And a product that did not sell. My first product after joining SunOn was a milk frother: square jug instead of round, transparent Tritan so you could watch the foam form, designed for the dishwasher. We sent more than a thousand samples to brands worldwide after several trade shows. It got attention. Attention did not become enough orders. We had never validated that anyone wanted it, and the complexity I was proud of slowly ate the cost advantage.
"It can be built" is an engineering conclusion. It does not mean "it should be built." The easiest mistake for an engineer is to fall in love with an answer and then go looking for a problem.
Both of those are the reason I ask uncomfortable questions early now, and why the first thing I want from a scoping call is the number of suppliers in your bill of materials rather than a description of your product.
The operating team. Supplier management, quality, cost control, audits and tooling assets for brands producing in China. Independent P&L, no personnel overlap with the factories.
Finished goods, and the contracting and invoicing entity depending on tax treatment and where the client sits.
Mold making, injection molding, die casting. The factory floor — and the source of the quarterly SunOn Manufacturing Cost Index.
A China+1 site in Semarang — 20,000 m², ground broken April 2025, handover expected end of 2026. I run the project and spend a week a month on site. What that means for your supply chain →
"I own factories" is a sentence anyone can write. Here is what is actually behind it, so you can judge for yourself.
Sun On Enterprises Group was founded in Hong Kong in 1995 by George Cheung, starting as a plastic moulding shop with around fifty people. It grew by absorbing and building: a metal and plastics operation in Shenzhen in 1997, Shen Hui Hardware & Electronics in 1999, a printing and coating operation in 2004, and Inox Appliances in 2014 for finished goods. I am a shareholder and partner in the group. Its headquarters and main plant are in Feng Gang, Dongguan.
| Today | |
|---|---|
| Site | 32,000 m², Feng Gang, Dongguan |
| People | 900 — 60 engineering, 60 quality, 580 production. The tool room alone is 380. |
| Tooling built | Over 10,000 sets, 30–40% for export |
| Die casting | 16 machines — original line: 2 hot chamber 138–250T, 6 cold chamber 200–800T; newer line: 8 machines 800–4,000T, aluminium or magnesium |
| Sheet metal | 2 laser cutters, 3 press brakes, 10 punch presses |
| Injection moulding | 79 machines, 50T–1200T · plus 10 two-shot machines, 140T–600T |
| CNC / EDM / milling / drilling | 158 machines — including 29 CNC, 13 high-speed CNC, 48 sinker EDM |
| Metrology | 6 CMMs, 6 vision measuring systems, XRF and RoHS analysers |
| Surface finishing, in house | Anodising, chrome plating, powder coating, painting, sand blasting |
| Engineering team | 30 tool engineers, 15 project engineers, 15 CNC programmers, 6 product designers |
Accuracy where it matters: high-speed CNC to ≤0.005mm, mirror EDM (Mitsubishi) to ≤0.005mm, grinding to ≤0.002mm, CMM to ≤0.0005mm. Design runs on UG, Pro/E, CATIA, SolidWorks, AutoCAD and Moldflow.
The group holds ISO 9001:2015 and ISO 14001:2015 (Intertek, UKAS-accredited) and IATF 16949, the automotive quality standard — which is a harder bar than most contract manufacturers a startup will meet.
But here is the part nobody volunteers, and the reason I tell founders to always ask for the scope page: our ISO scope covers mould making and injection moulding. It does not cover die casting. The certificate says "Design and Production of Moulds for Plastic Injection" — that is the actual wording.
I would rather tell you that than have you find it during due diligence. It is also exactly the check I would want you running on any supplier, including me: a certificate on a wall means nothing until you have read what it covers.
The group keeps on-site customer support in Germany, and works in German, English and Chinese. For European founders that removes the single most tiring part of manufacturing in Asia — the day of lag on every question.